Showing posts with label Kojima. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kojima. Show all posts

Sunday, January 15, 2023

Predicting the future in Japan: Kojima, Narita, Saito and Uchida

A new book in Japanese has appeared, whose translated title is "Future Prediction of Geniuses."

My attempt to post about it caused html errors on the blog, so this is a replacement for the original post, with just a link to the twitter thread here: https://twitter.com/booksmagazine/status/1611291463291404288

Google translate works pretty well at letting English speakers know what it says.



Saturday, October 16, 2021

Market design in Tokyo

 Fuhito Kojima and Hiroaki Odahara report on some of the projects presently underway at the University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD), which include matching for child care, for medical residencies, and for internal labor markets.

Kojima, F., Odahara, H. Toward market design in practice: a progress report. Japanese Economic Review, (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42973-021-00103-w

Abstract: In recent years, many developments have been made in matching theory and its applications to market design. This paper surveys some selected topics from this research area and describe our own work. We also describe the newly established University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD), which works as a vehicle for practical implementation.

Tuesday, October 5, 2021

Fuhito Kojima and I will discuss improving social welfare with matching theory in a Nikkei Business webinar this evening

Fuhito Kojima and I will participate in a Nikkei Business Zoom webinar on The Future of Management 2030, in English and Japanese (I think translation will be available).

 "Nikkei Business LIVE will hold a webinar entitled "The Future of Management 2030: Rebuilding Capitalism and Revitalizing Innovation" for three days from October 5th to 7th. 

Our discussion, on "Creating a better society by implementing matching theory" will be at 11AM tomorrow in Japan (which is 7PM this evening in California).

"Creating a better society by implementing matching theory in society"

"Auction theory that was in the limelight at the 2020 Nobel Prize in Economics. It is one of the theories representing the new field of microeconomics, "market design," which seeks to design a market in which traders can satisfy each other, rather than analyzing the existing market as in the past. The pioneer who won the Nobel Prize in Economics for "market design" is "matching theory" by Professor Alvin Roth and others. He talks with Professor Fuhito Kojima of the University of Tokyo Graduate School of Economics, who is a direct pupil and a former colleague at Stanford University, about the future brought about by the social implementation of economic theory." (via Google translate)





Sunday, November 8, 2020

Interviews with Fuhito Kojima, Bob Wilson, and Al Roth in the Japanese economic magazine Diamond Weekly

 Here are three interviews conducted by the journalist Kohei Takeda for the Japanese economic magazine  DIAMOND WEEKLY, on their website DIAMOND ONLINE.   

Here are the headlines and beginnings via Google Translate.

The essence of the Nobel Prize in Economics "Game Theory", explained by a former colleague of the award winner--Interview with Fuhito Kojima, Professor of the University of Tokyo, Director of Market Design Center, University of Tokyo  by Kohei Takeda : Reporter

The interview begins with these opening words from Fuhito:

"Eight years ago, when Al (Professor at Alvin Roth Stanford University), who I had been taught, received the award, we held a grand celebration and press conference. I thought I couldn't do that this year due to the spread of the new coronavirus infection, but in the evening of the award day (October 12), planned by him and his wife Emily, in the garden of Al's house. A small celebration was held while keeping a certain distance from each other.

"At universities in the United States, teachers and students tend to live very close to the campus, so fellow researchers have more relationships with their neighbors. I still lived near the university, so I received an invitation email from Emily on the day and participated in the celebration. ...

"To me, Paul was a colleague at the university, but he is also like a mentor. After I got a job at Stanford University about 10 years ago, my research field was the same "market design" in the Faculty of Economics (Editor's note: one of the research fields of game theory) , and sometimes I wrote a co-authored paper. , I was able to build a good relationship.

"He is a major researcher I have known since I was a student... Bob taught both Al and Paul, so academically I'm also Bob's "grandson."

************

2020 Nobel Prize Winner "Auction Theory for Business" Special Lecture--Interview with Professor Emeritus of Robert Wilson Stanford University by Kohei Takeda : Reporter

The first thing Bob was asked to explain was his work on the winner's curse:

"I started working in this area in the 1960s. The background to this was the issue of oil drilling rights among US oil companies at that time. They had very incomplete information about what their oil reserves were. From the size of the oil field to whether or not it was filled with hydrocarbons, there were many things we didn't know. Oil companies were under pressure to estimate their reserves in such an unknown environment.

"When auctioning under these circumstances, each participating player tends to overestimate in order to win the bid. In this case, each estimate is a function to increase the likelihood of bidding, but oil companies face the challenge of significantly lower rates of return after investing in oil rigs. Was there.

"Eventually, this is (in a situation where each player does not have the same information, the information is asymmetrical, and the player eventually chooses the less valuable one in an attempt to maximize his or her profits). (Adverse selection) ”was recognized as a problem. In other words, there was a tendency to win bids only when overestimating.

"What I have built is a theory for bidding various things in the best possible way, taking into account the situation of such adverse selection. This achievement has attracted a great deal of attention and is one of my early achievements in research. The negative effect of overestimating what is being bid on and winning the auction has been called "Winner's Curse". However, the best bidding strategy takes its existence into account, so you won't suffer from the curse of the winner."

***********

Nobel laureate in economics "Matching theory that can be used in business" --Interview with Professor Alvin Roth Stanford University by Kohei Takeda : Reporter


Sunday, November 18, 2018

Congratulations to Fuhito Kojima, on the Enjoji Jiro Memorial Prize

My colleague Fuhito Kojima has a lot to be congratulated on lately, and today comes another cause for congratulations.  He shares the 5th Enjoji Jiro Memorial Prize by the Japan Center for Economic Research. The prize recognizes 'young and mid-level economists under 45 years of age who have made achievements in the field of economic theory, and have a promising future.'

Here's the story from today's Nikkei Shimbun Morning Paper:

第5回「円城寺次郎記念賞」 小島・渡辺両氏に

2018/11/18付
日本経済新聞 朝刊

"The 5th "Jiroji Jiro Memorial Award" To Mr. Kojima and Mr. Watanabe"

Congratulations, Fuhito!

**********
I used Google translate to translate the headline, but for the following paragraph it had trouble with a word that I gather in this context means "between junior and senior in age/career," which came out as saying that Fuhito is a "young and medium-sized economist ." (The description of the prize above comes from an English language report on the 2009 prize...)

Thursday, September 18, 2008

Bibliography of matching--update

I maintain a web-based Bibliography of matching and market design, and it is getting harder to keep it up to date as the field grows. (This is a good problem to have. If you have some papers that should be there, please send me a list in a form I can cut and paste:) I just added/updated the following papers by Fuhito Kojima:

Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets (2007), with Parag A. Pathak, American Economic Review, forthcoming.

Random Assignment of Multiple Indivisible Objects (2007), forthcoming, Mathematical Social Sciences.

Matching with Contracts: Comment (2007), with John William Hatfield, American Economic Review, forthcoming..

Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism with General Priority Structures (2007), Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming.

The Law of Aggregate Demand and Welfare in the Two-Sided Matching Market (2007),
Economics Letters, forthcoming.

When can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? Maximal Domain Results (2007),
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (contribution), Article 32.

Matching and Price Competition: Comment (2007),
American Economic Review 97, pp 1027-1031.

Random Paths to Pairwise Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems: A Study on Market Equilibration (2006), with M. Utku Ünver,
International Journal of Game Theory (the Special Issue in Honor of David Gale), 2008.

Mixed Strategies in Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-Intern Markets (2006),
Social Choice and Welfare 27, pp 25-28.

Strategy-Proofness of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism in Large Random Assignment Problems (2007), with Mihai Manea

Competitive Claims and Resource Allocation by Deferred Acceptance (2007), with Mihai Manea,

Finding All Stable Matchings with Couples (2007), revise

Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (2008), with Yeon-Koo Che

Group Incentive Compatibility for Matching with Contracts (2007), with John William Hatfield

Substitutes and Stability for Matching with Contracts (2007), with John William Hatfield